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Gun Control*
Hugh LaFollette
Many of us assume we must eithcr oppose or support gun control. Not
so. We have a range of alternatives. Even this way of speaking oversimplifies
our choices since there are two distinct scales on which to place alternatives.
One scale concerns the degree (if at all) to which guns should be abolished.
This scale moves from those who want no abolition (NA) of any guns, through
those who want moderate abolition (MA) - to forbid access to some subclasses
of guns - to those who want absolute abolition (AA).
The second scale
concerns the restrictions (if any) on those guns that are available to private
citizens. This scale moves from those who want absolute restrictions (AR)
through those who want modcrate restrictions (MR) to those who want no
restrictions (NR) at all. Rcstrictions valY not only in strength but also in
content. We could restrict who owns guns, how they obtain them, where and
how they store them, and where and how they can carry them.
Our options are further complicated by the union of these scales. On
one exh'eme no privatc citizen can own any guns (AA, which is functionally
equivalent to AR), while at the other extreme, every private citizen can own any
gun, with no restrictions (NA+NR). But once we leave those extremes, which
few people hold, the options are defined by a pair of coordinates along these
distinct scales. While most people embrace positions on the "same" end of both
scales, others embrace more exotic mixtures: some will want few weapons
available to private citizens, but virtually no restrictions on those guns that are
available (MA+NR), while others may prefer making most guns available, but
want to seriously restrict them (NA+MR).
So our choice is not merely to support or oppose gun control, but to
decide who can own which guns, under what conditions.
Although I cannot
pretend to provide a definitivc account here, I can isolate the central issues and
offer the broad outline of an appropriate solution.
To simplify discussion, I
adopt the following locutions: those opposed to most abolition and most
restrictions advocate a "serious right to bear arms," while those supporting more
widespread abolition and more substantial restrictions are "gun control
advocates."
This simplification, of course, masks significant disagreements
among advocates of each position.
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OWNERSHIP OF GUNS

A Moral Question
Do citizens have a "serious right to bear anTIs"? This is a moral
question, not a Constitutional one. For even if the Constitution did grant this
right, we should determine if there are sufficiently compelling arguments against
private gun ownership to warrant changing the Constitution. On the other hand,
if this were not a Constitutional right, we should determine if there are strong
reasons why the state should not ban or control guns, and if these reasons are
sufficiently compelling to make this a constitutional right. Most defenders of
private gun ownership claim we do have a moral right - as well as a
Constitutional one - and that this right is not an ordinary right, but a
fundamental one.
A fundamental right
If they are cOlTect, they would have the justificatory upper hand. Were
this a fundamental right, it would not be enough to show that society would
benefit
from
controlling
access
to
guns
(Hughes, T. C. & Hunt, L. 11. unpublished).
The arguments for gun control
would have to be overwhelming.
Yet there is also a hefty cost in claiming that
this is a fundamental right: the evidence for the right must meet especially
rigorous standards.
What makes a right fundamental?
A fundamental right is a nonderivative right protecting a fundamental
interest.
Not every interest we
individually cherish is fundamental.
Since most interests are prized by
someone, such a notion of "fundamental interest" would be anemic, serving no
special justificatory role. Fundamental interests are special: they are integrally
related to a person's chance of living a good life, whatever her particular
interests, desires, and beliefs happen to be. For example, living in a society
that protects speech creates an environment within which each of us can pursue
our particular interests, goals, needs, and development, whatever our interests
happen to be. Is the purported right to bear arms like this paradigmatic
fundamental right?
Even if it were, that would not straightfOlwardly establish that it is
impermissible to abolish or restrict private ownership of guns.
After all,
fundamental rights standardly have conditions, boundaries, or restrictions on
them. Some rights, like the right to vote, are conditional upon reaching a
specified age, and they can be forfeited by emigrants and imprisoned felons.
Additionally, most right tokens can be restricted or overridden when the
exercise of that right hamls others. For example, my right to free religious
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expressIOn gives me wide discretion in how I exercise my religion.
I can
remove my kids from high school and exclude them from selected school
activities (Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp.
270). I can sacrifice animals (Church of the Lukumi Sabalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520).
Nonetheless, it does not pennit me to sacrifice
humans. Nor does my right to free speech permit me to slander someone or to
preach outside her window at 2:00 a.m. Tokens of fundamental rights may be
restricted to protect othcrs from serious harms arising from the exercise of those
rights.
Of course rights would not be worth much if they were
straightforwardly subject to the wishes of the majority.
We fiercely defend
fundamental right types although their tokens sometimes undercut society's
interests. We cannot restrict or put conditions on fundamental rights except for
compelling reasons, and individuals cannot forfeit their fundamental rights (if
they can forfeit them at all) except for ovelwhelming reasons. Still, although
tokens of a right sometimes
run counter to the majority's
wishes
(Dworkin, R. M. 1977), we should not infer that rights standardly undennine
the public interest.
Fundamental rights (freedom of speech, freedom of
association, etc.) benefit society as well as individuals. Pennitting free speech,
religion, and association is the best - and arguably the only - way for society to
uncover the truth (M ill, J. S. 1978). Of course, not every right has such a
significant social payoff -- although most fundamental rights do. Still, we
minimally assume fundamental rights (right types) do not hann society.
This provides a framework for evaluating people's claims that a right is
fundamental. Advocates must show that and how granting the right protects
individuals' fundamental interests, and they must be prepared to respond to
objections that granting that right type will harm society. These are serious
obstacles for gun advocates. It is difficult to sec that a serious right to bear
anns satisfies either of these requirements, let alone both.
First, I see no compelling reason to think that owning a gun is a
fundamental interest.
Other fundamental interests. are necessary to one's
flourishing no matter what her particular desires, interests, and beliefs. It is
difficult to see how this is true of guns. Moreover, the interests protected by
paradigmatic fundamental rights - our interests in unfettered speech, freedom of
religion, and freedom of association - are not merely means to my flourishing,
they are elements constituting it. By contrast, having a gun in my bed stand, in
my closet, or on my person might be a means for me to achieve my ends, but
they are not constitutive elements of my flourishing. Hence, owning guns is
not a fundamental interest.
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• Wheeler disagrees. He argues that the right to bear arms is fundamental
since guns are the best way to protect our fundamental interest in self-defen e
(1997). However, on his view, guns are not inherently valuable; they are
valuable only as a means of self-defense (pp. 433-8). I fail to see how this
could make the right to bear anns fundamental.
Not every means to a
fundamental interest is a fundamental right. That would arguably make most
actions protected by fundamental rights. Nonetheless, the connection between
owning guns and self-defense is an important issue that I address later.
Others might claim that gun ownership is an essential element for the
flourishing of a proper citizen. A proper citizen, on this view, is one capable of
providing for and defending his family. Although each citizen can (general1y)
fend for himself, citizens come together to form a limited government to
provide those few needs they cannot easily satisfy on their own. However, this
vision of the citizen is very controversial, more controversial than the interest in
gun ownership it seeks to justify. It assumes each of us has far more control
over our lives than we arguably do have. Furthermore, even if this conception
were defensible, it would not establish a fundamental right to bear arn1S since
guns are mere means to independent citizenship; they are not constitutive of that
citizenship. Hence, it is doubtful that the purported right to bear 'arms satisfies
the first requirement of a fundamental right.
Second, we have evidence that granting this right type does hann
society. If this evidence is at al1 credible, then granting this purported right
would not satisfy the second requirement either.
But this does not resolve the issue. Although people do not have a
fundamental right to own guns, gun control might be wrong because it violates
some derivative right or simply because it is bad public policy.
Derivative right
Suppose we determined that "the right to bear arms" is not a
fundamental right, but a derivative right. This would stil1 be a significant
finding since derivative rights, like fundamental ones, cannot be restricted
without good evidence. Prima facie, I think we have such a derivative right.
Each of us has a fundamental right of noninterference: we should be al10wed to
live our lives as we wish, so long as we do not thereby harm others. This is a
right each of us needs, no matter what our particular interests. That general
right derivatively protects personal1y important activities.
For instance, I would be furious if the state forbade me (i'om sharing a
pint with a friend. Nonetheless, although consuming alcohol is a pa11icular
interest and enjoyment I have, it is not a constitutive element of the good life in
the way that the freedoms of speech, freedom, and association are. That is why
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I do not have a fundamental right to consume alcohol.
Consequently, the
conditions under which my consumption of alcohol can be legitimately
restricted are more lax than they would be if the activity were a fundamental
interest.
Nonetheless, since I have a prima facie derivative right to consume
alcohol, the state can legitimately abolish or restrict alcohol consumption only
if they can show that so doing is an effective means of protecting the public
from harm. They can do that in some cases: people who consume substantial
amounts of alcohol are dangerous drivers. Since this behavior is unacceptably
risky to others, the state can legitimately restrict drinking while driving.
Whether privately owning guns is similarly risky is something we must
discover.
Bad Public Policy
If private gun ownership were not a derivative right, it might still be
bad policy to substantially restrict or abolish guns. There are always costs of
enforcing a law. Sometimes these costs are prohibitive, especially when the
public does not support that law. Ifthe public will not voluntarily comply with
the law, then the state must try to force compliance. In their efforts to do so,
they invariably employ excessively intrusive methods.
Such methods never
entirely succeed, and, to the extent that they do, they undermine public
confidence in and support for all Law. Consider America's experience with
Prohibition.
Although one of Prohibition's aims - to protect innocents from
harm caused by those under the influence - was laudable, the law was
unenforceable and excessively costly. Consequently, less than two decades after
Prohibition was passed via Constitutional amendment, it was repealed.
The cost of enforcing any law -- and especially an unpopular law weighs against making any behavior illegal unless we have solid evidence that
the behavior is seriously harmful. If we adopt a weaker standard - if we
criminalize every action type whose tokens occasionally lead to some harm then we would criminalize most behavior. Consequently, even if there were no
right to bear anns, we should still not seek to substantially limit private
ownership of guns unless we have good reason to think that will prevent serious
harm.
Summing up: justifying the private ownership of gUlls
The preceding analysis isolates three questions we must answer in
deciding whether people should be permitted to own guns: (I) How important is
owning a gun to some people? (2) What are the consequences of private gun
ownership?
(3) Is abolishing or restricting private ownership of guns bad
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policy?' Although gun ownership is not a fundamental interest, many people
want to own guns and think they have good reason to do so. That is sufficient
to show that serious gun control would undermine gun owners' interests.
Moreover, there is some reason to think that serious gun control in countries
with a strong tradition of gun ownership would be bad policy. Therefore, we
should certainly not abolish, and arguably should not restrict, private ownership
of guns without good reason. Are there good reasons? To answer this question,
we must detelmine the effects of private gun ownership: (a) How likely is it that
private gun ownership seriously harms others? (b) Are there substantial benefits
of gun ownership that might counterbalance any harm?
HARM,

DANGER,

AND RISK

We must be careful when we say that guns cause harm. Guns kill
people because agents use them to kill people (or misuse them in ways that
cause people to be killed).
As the National Rifle Association (NRA) puts it:
"guns don't kill people, people do." In one sense their claim is uncontroversial:
Murder i's the act of an agent, and guns are not agents. In another way, their
claim is irrelevant. No gun control advocate claims, hints, or suggests that
guns are moral agents. Guns are objects and objects do no evil. But not all
objects are created equal.
Imagine the NNWA (National Nuclear Weapons
Association) claiming that "tactical nuclear weapons don't kill people, people
do." While in one sense their claim would be true, in a more profound way, it
would be ludicrous.
Of course guns are not nuclear weapons. Guns are not as dangerous as
nuclear weapons and some .guns have seemingly legitimate uses. The question
is whether the character of guns makes them especially harmful. We know that
some objects - tactical nuclear weapons, biochemical weapons, live grenades,
etc., are much more dangerous than feathers, ice cream, and butter knives.
Where do guns fall along this continuum?
There are two distinct but related questions: (I) are guns "inherently
dangerous"; and (2) what is the empirical probability that they cause serious
harm? "Inherently dangerous" objects are those whose nature or design is
sufficient to justify our prediction that they will cause harm, independently of
any empirical evidence. We do not need double-blind empirical studies to know
that nuclear weapons are inherently dangerous: they were designed to cause
harm, and their nature is such that we can confidently predict they will cause
harm. The two questions are intricately related since inherently dangerous
objects are more likely to cause serious harm. Yet they are separable because
some dangerous objects are not inherently so.
Automobiles, alcohol, and
cigarettes were not designed to cause harm, but all are causally implicated in
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many people's deaths. Other things being equal, we are more prone to control
inherently dangerous objects than objects that merely have harm as an unwanted
side effect.
Guns, unlike autos, are inherently dangerous. Guns were invented for
the military;
they
were designed
to cause (and threaten)
hann
(Singer, C., 1I0lmyard, E. J., Hall, A. R., & Williams, T. 1956: 367). The
same aims determine the ways in which guns are redesigned: they are changed to
make them more efficient at causing harm. In contrast, a significant aim of
redesigning automobiles is to make them less dangerous. To some extent these
efforts have succeeded. Although the absolute number of annual traffic fatalities
has not noticeably declined, the number of fatalities per mile traveled has
declined 75% since the 50s (Hemenway, D. 1995: 52.)
We have enhanced the
auto's original aim of efficient transportation while lessening harmful side
effects. That is why we can sensibly say that the automobile is not inherently
dangerous despite the fact that it causes harm. We cannot say the same for
guns.
The literature of gun advocates supports my contention that guns are
inherently dangerous. They advocate the private ownership of guns to prevent
crime and to arm the militia. Guns can serve these purposes only because they
are effective means of inflicting and threatening harm. Even guns normally not
used to harm humans have purposes that ride piggyback on this fundamental
purpose. Shotguns are used to kill animals, and target guns are designed to be
especially accurate. Taken together, this evidence supports the common view
that guns are inherently dangerous.
That is why we have special reasons to
regulate them.
Although inherently dangerous, guns are far less dangerous than
weapons of mass destruction, and they do have seemingly legitimate uses. That
is why we must show just how risky they are before we can legitimately abolish
or seriously restrict them. We must also determine if they have sufficient
benefits so that we should permit them, even if risky.
All intermediate cOllclusion

We have shown that owning guns is not a fundamental interest and that
guns are inherently dangerous. That is why we cannot categorically dismiss all
forms of gun control. However, this is a weak conclusion. For although guns
are inherently dangerous, they may not be so dangerous as to justify more than a
system of minimal registration·.
What seems clear is that their inherent
dangerousness precludes the idea that guns cannot be subject to governmental
control. Some form of gun control cannot be categorically dismissed. Before
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determi~ing the actual danger that guns present, we should first determine how
risky an action must be before we can justifiably restrict it.
RISK

Humans are notoriously bad at judging risk. Often we are unaware of,
or are inattentive to, the seriousness of risks. For instance, we may drive
inebriated. At other times we overestimate the risks. For instance, we may
refuse to fly because we think it is too dangerous.
A proper determination of
risk would be based on a careful accounting of the action's costs and benefits.
We should determine (I) the probability of harm, (2) the seriousness of hann
(the product of the gravity and extent of the harm), (3) the probability of
achieving the benefits, (4) the significance of the benefits (the product of the
importance and extent of the benefit), and then act accordingly.
Of course even
if we reached the same determination to the above questions, we might still
disagree about whether to act: we might disagree about what risks are worth
which benefits. Nonetheless, we can all agree that (a) as the likelihood and
seriousness of harm increase, we have increased reason to refrain from acting,
while (b) as the likelihood and importance of the benefits increase, we have
increased reasons to act. We can import these lessons into the law.
Legal rules
But not straightforwardly.
The issue is not whether we should own
guns if they are legal, although that is a fascinating question. The question is
whether the state should curtail private gun ownership.
The foregoing
considerations are relevant but not decisive. The decision to permit private
ownership of guns is shaped by two factors pulling in opposite directions.
First, even if we think Roger (an adult) stupidly engages in a dangerous activity
(sky diving or boxing or racing), we might think Roger's autonomy requires
that we permit it. Our commitment to individual liberty weighs against the
government's abolishing or restricting the private ownership of guns as a way of
limiting hann (Hughes, T. C. & Hunt, L. H. unpublished).
Second, some
actions (smoking in public places) that arc acceptably risky to Roger might be
unacceptably risky to others. Are guns also unacceptably risky to others?
Put differently, gun control does not concern what private individuals
should do, but what governments should allow private individuals to do. We
must determine the risk of permitting the private ownership of guns, constrained
by these complicating considerations.
To illustrate how this might work,
consider the following example. We have evidence that a number of wrecks are
caused by drivers using cell phones. Roger wants to use his cell phone while
commuting to work. He decides the inconvenience of not using the cell phone
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is worse than the small probability of personal harm. He might overestimate
the inconvenience of not being able to use his cell phone or insufficiently
appreciate the seriousness of the risk. However, since he is an adult, we might
think we should not interfere with his decision to use a cell phone while
driving. That is what autonomy requires. Yet Roger is not the only person at
risk. Passengers in his or other cars may also be harmed. The seriousness of
harm to them must also be considered in deciding to permit or restrict drivers'
use of cell phones.
These judgements of risk must be further tempered by the costs of
enforcement mentioned earlier. Although we know that using cell phones while
driving may lead to accidents, we also know other activities may do the same.
Drinking coffee while driving. Eating a donut. Looking at a map. Talking to
a passenger. Driving more than two hours without stopping. Driving on less
than six hours of sleep.
Driving home after a bad day at the office.
Presumably we should not make all these illegal. The probabilities of serious
harm are small and enforcing such laws would require far- reaching intrusions
into evelyone's life. When the risks of an activity's causing grave harm to
many others are small and the costs of interference are significant, then we
should not criminalize the action.
But as the probability of grave and
widespread harm increases, then, other things being equal, we should
criminalize the action.
For instance, when people are released from prison (and not just on
parole) they have "paid their debt to society."
Yet we do not permit them to
own a gun. We judge that they are more likely to hann others. Of course not
all of them - and likely not a majority of them - would harm others if they
were permitted to own a gun. They are prevented from owning guns because
they are members of a group statistically more likely to cause harm: we judge
that allowing former felons to own guns is unacceptably risky. The National
Rifle Association and most other gun advocates agree.
Someone might counter, though, that we deny felons the right to own
guns not because we judge that permitting them to own guns is risky, but that
they, by their actions, haveforfeited the right to own guns. But that is not the
best justification for our action. Why should felons forfeit their right after they
have served their time and are free of all obligations to the state? For instance,
while imprisoned in the United States felons do forfeit their right against
unlawful searches and seizures. But once they are released from prison (and are
no longer on parole or probation), a former felon has an unconditional right
against unlawful searches and seizures - the same as evelY other United States
resident.
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•At first glance, there is some reason to think felons who use guns in
commission of a crime could forfeit their right to own a gun, in the same way
that drunk drivers lose their licenses. However, drunk drivers do not lose their
licenses forever, while in most jurisdictions felons are never pennitted to own
guns. Moreover the prohibition against former felons_ owning guns is not
limited to those who used guns in the commission of a crime. Hence, it is
more plausible to think that we can prevent released felons from owning guns
because we judge that they are more likely to commit crimes with guns.
This is our rational for all laws proscribing risky actions. Every drunk
driver does not cause an accident. Most do not. Yet we do not flinch at laws
forbidding drunk driving. For it is not merely that drunk divers are statistically
more likely to cause harm, they are more likely to cause hann because they are
inebriated. We can arguably use the same rationale to justify restricting access
to guns. We restrict access not only because guns are inherently dangerous, but
because - if gun control advocates are right -- permitting private ownership of
guns is very risky.
WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW

We can now specify what we must know to intelligently decide
whether to prohibit or restrict gun ownership (or any other risky action): (I) Is
there a statistically significant cOlTelation between the action (private ownership
of guns) and harm (homicides, accidental deaths, suicides, anned robbery)? (2)
Do we have good reason to think this correlation indicates that the purportedly
risky action causes the hann? (3) How serious are these resultant harms? (4)
How important is the activity that the state wishes to control (a) to the
individual agent and (b) to the society?
In deciding whether to restrict the behavior, we must balance these
considerations using the following general guidelines:
(I) If we have evidence that the behavior causes haIm, then we have
some reason to limit the behavior. As the evidence increases, the reasons for
prohibiting the behavior increase. As the probability that the behavior will lead
to serious hann (the product of the gravity and extent of the harm) approaches
certainly, then the reasons for forbidding the behavior become very strong. (2)
The more grave and widespread the potential harm, the more reason we have to
constrain the behavior. If the gravity and extent of the hann are substantial, we
might constrain the behavior even if our evidence that the behavior causes the
harm is moderate. (3) The higher the probability that allowing the action will
have important benefits, the stronger the reason to permit it. The greater the
benefits, the greater the reason to pennit it.
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Libertarians might claim that individuals' rights are so strong that the
state cannot justifiably intervene, even to constrain those who put others at
extreme risk. The state should not proscribe risky actions, although they can
intervene after harm has occurred. This use of "risk" is misleading. If on one
occasion 1 drive while inebriated, I engage in a risky action: there is some
probability that I and others will be hanTIed. However, permitting people to
drive inebriated will definitely cause hanTI, although we cannot specify in
advance who will be harmed. A personal decision to own a gun is risky in the
fonner sense.
A decision to permit citizens to privately own guns is depending on the evidence - risky in the latter sense. If gun control advocates
are right about the evidence, then we have good grounds to constrain private gun
use. The question is: are they right?
ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE

Arm-chair arguments
Debates over gun control typically begin, and sometimes end, with
anTIchair arguments. Both sides offer armchair explanations of why (and how)
the presence (or absence) of guns will increase (or decrease) violent crime. It is
tempting to' categorically dismiss annchair arguments since they seem to be
poor substitutes for empirical evidence. However, it would be a mistake to
assume we could devise sound empirical studies or understand their results
without armchair arguments. In a study to discover if widespread availability of
guns increases homicides or decreases crimes, we need armchair arguments to
tell us which variables we should control (e.g., Lott, J. R. 1998: 21-4).
Without them we would not know that we should control for the extent of
poverty, the incidence of drug use, increases in the number of police officers, or
the introduction of tougher (or more lax) penalties. Without them we would not
know that we do not need to control for the price of mayonnaise, the criminal's
eye color, or who won the World Series.
Ann-chair arguments also take center stage in evaluating empirical
studies, in criticizing experimental design and in reinterpreting the reported
findings (Black, D. & Nagin, D. 1998; Cook, P. J., Mollinoni, S., & Cole, T.
B. 1995; Cook, P. J., Ludwig, J., & Hemenway, D. 1997; Hemenway, D.
1997; Hemenway, D. 1998; LoU, J. R. 1998; Wheeler, S. C., Jr. 1997). So
before I discuss the empirical evidence, 1 summarize some significant annchair
arguments employed by gun advocates and gun control advocates.
(i) More weapons, l'~lOreviolence
Gun control supporters offer empirical evidence of a positive correlation
between murder rates and the availability of guns (especially handguns).
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Availability of guns is also positively con-elated with suicide and accident rates.
This empirical evidence is best understood against the background of the
following armchair argument: (I) Guns (and especially handguns) are the easiest
way to kill others or oneself. People can stand at a relatively safe distance and
pull the trigger. (2) When people are angry, they act in ways they do not
normally act. They may strike out at others. If they have a gun close to hand,
they are more likely to use that gun. Although they could resort to a knife or a
baseball bat, they are less likely to do so, and, even if they do, those weapons
are less likely to cause a serious or fatal injury. (3) When people are depressed,
they act in ways they would not act normally. If they have a gun close to hand,
they are more likely to kill themselves. Although they might slit their wrists or
take pills, they are less likely to do so, and, even if they do, they are less likely
to kill themselves. (4) When people handle guns, even for a legitimate purpose,
the probability of serious or fatal injury to themselves or others increases.
When children have access to guns, the likelihood of an accident increases still
more.
The conclusion of the armchair argument is clear:' the more widely
available guns are, the more people will be murdered, will commit suicide, and
will die of accidents. This is a plausible armchair prediction.
Perhaps it is
wrong. Maybe .it is reasonable but overinflated.
Or it might be that the
prediction is well founded, but that the widespread availability of guns is
nonetheless justified.
What is apparent is that the claim that widespread
availability of guns increases the number of homicides, suicides, and accidental
deaths is highly plausible. It is difficult to imagine it is false.
(ii) Availability of guns prevents or stops crimes
Pro-gun supporters offer empirical evidence supporting the claim that
guns prevent crime; their armchair arguments undergird and explain those
studies. The motivating idea is simple: most criminals want to minimize their
risks when committing a crime. If they know that someone in a house is
armed, they will be less likely to enter that house, at least when the person is
home and awake. Potential criminals are also less likely to assault or rob
someone whom they believe is carrying a weapon. Finally, when criminals try
to rob or assault an anned person, the person is more likely to foil the crime.
This, too, is a plausible annchair prediction. Perhaps it is wrong. Maybe the
claim is overinflated.
Perhaps guns have these benefits, but there are other
effects of owning guns - e.g., those mentioned above - which outweigh them.
What is apparent is that the claim that the widespread availability of guns would
prevent or thwart some crimes is highly plausible. It is difficult to imagine that
it is false.
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Of course we cannot stop with these annchair arguments.
assess the empirical evidence.

We must

THE DATi\.

The empirical evidence is difficult to assess, and, to the extent that we
can, it does not univocally support either side. You might not know that from
listening to the public policy debate.
Some gun control advocates imply that
strict guns laws would all but eliminate murder, while some gun advocates
imply that having a gun in every home would virtually end crime. Both claims
are unfounded. Gun control will not virtually eliminate murder. Arming all
citizens will not virtually eliminate crime. About that we can be confident.
The problem is determining the precise effects of permitting or restricting guns.
The available evidence is less than compelling. But we must make a judgement
based on the best evidence we have.
The connection between availability of guns and murder
Perhaps the most well established statistic is this: the more widely
available guns (especially handguns) are, the more people are murdered. The
figures are duplicated time and again in country after country.
Here is the
bottom line: "the correlation between any-gun prevalence and the overall murder
rate is .67, while it is .84 between handgun prevalence and overall murder rate.
"(Carter, G. L. 1997: 3). These figures are significant to the .01 level; that is,
the chance that these correlations could occur merely by chance is less than one
out of 100. This correlation meets the statisticians' gold standard.
But this does not resolve the issue, for it does not establish what gun
control advocates claim it shows, namely, that gun control is an effective way of
substantially lessening the murder rate. First, a statistical correlation shows that
two things are linked, but it does not tell us if the first caused the second, the
second caused the first, or if there is some third factor which caused both.
Second, even if the items are causally related, we do not know that changing the
cause will automatically and straightfolwardly change the effect since another
factor might intervene to sustain the effect.
Gun advocates proffer their own armchair explanation for the
correlations: These correlations reflect the character of the respective social and
political systems. The European countries where murder rates are lower have
more social solidarity and are more heterogeneous than the United States.
Whether these social factors explain all the correlation is debatable, but I am
confident they explain some of it. Were the United States to regulate guns as

13

The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol.12

No.1

tightly as most European countries, our murder rates would arguably fall, but
they would not immediately plummet to their levels.
We might settle the issue if we conducted controlled experiments,
randomly dividing our population in half, giving half of them guns, removing
all the guns from the other half, and then monitoring the murder rate. Of
course, that would be morally unacceptable, politically unrealistic, and probably
even scientifically unachievable.
Before we had enough time to exclude all
possible intervening causes, sufficient time might have elapsed so that new
intervening causes could have emerged. But we are not in the dark. We have
empirical evidence that helps adjudicate between competing explanations of the
correlation.
First, we have empirical evidence, bolstered by armchair arguments,
that guns are more lethal than other weapons. Some claim the ratio is 5: I; no
estimates are lower than 2: I (Reiss, A. J., Jr. & Roth, 1. A. 1993: 260). This
partly explains the strong correlation between guns and homicides. If people get
angry the same number of times, those using the most lethal weapons are more
likely to kill their victims.
Second, the nature of secondary gun markets helps explain how the
widespread availability of guns increases crime in general, and homicides in
specific. Various opponents of gun control claim that "If we outlaw guns, only
outlaws will have guns."
Annchair arguments suggest why this is a silly
claim. Where, one might ask, do criminals get their guns? They often steal
them or buy them from those who purchased them legally. Even guns obtained
from other criminals are usually traceable to people who purchased them legally.
Empirical evidence supports this armchair supposition.
Most criminals report
having stolen their guns, received them from a friend or family member, or
purchased them from someone who had stolen it. At least half a million guns
are stolen each year (Cook, P. J. et al. 1995: 81), and these swell the numbers
of guns available illegally.
Not only does the primary (legal) market effect the availability of guns
on secondary markets, it also affects the price of guns on those markets, much
"like the analogous markets for motor vehicles or prescription drugs"
(Cook, P. 1. et al. 1995: 71). As we restrict availability of guns in the primary
market, the supply of guns in the secondary markets decreases and their cost
increases (Cook, P. 1. et al. 1995: 73). This increase in cost will diminish
teenagers' ability to obtain guns, since they are least able to afford hefty prices.
Since teenagers commit most deadly crimes, decreasing the availability of legal
guns will thereby decrease the number of homicides. Conversely, having huge
numbers of legally available guns increases the number of guns on secondary
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markets and typically lowers their price. This makes it easier for prospective
criminals, including teenagers, to obtain guns.
Third, having a gun around the house (or on the person) - even for selfprotection - apparently increases the chance that someone in the family will kill
themselves with the gun, or will be the victim of a homicide or an accident.
One study found that "for every time a gun in the home was involved in a selfprotection homicide, they noted 1.3 unintentional deaths, 4.5 criminal
homicides, and 37 firearm suicides" (Reiss, A. l, Jr. & Roth, J. A. 1993: 267).
This implies that for every case where someone in a gun-owning household uses
a gun to successfully stop a life-threatening attack, nearly 43 people in similar
households will die from a gunshot.
Taken together the evidence does not
prove that widespread availability of guns increases the number of homicides.
However, that empirical evidence, bolstered by earlier armchair arguments,
makes the claim highly plausible.
The lise of gUlls to prevent crime
The biggest "gun" in the anti-gun control lobby is the claim that
having (and perhaps carrying) a gun prevents crime. As I noted earlier, this is a
sensible annchair claim. Someone contemplating a robbery is more likely to
proceed if they think they can succeed with little risk to themselves. So if a
prospective robber believes the tenants are at home and have a gun they know
how to use, then he will likely seek another target.
Two surveys support this
belief. According to one survey, 4% of all Americans have used a handgun in
the past five years to avert a crime. Given those figures, researchers estimates
that there are at least 600,000 defensive uses of guns per year. Kleck uses these
results, in conjunction with another survey, to claim that the number might be
as high as 2.5 million (1991: 105-6). Given the number of violent crimes using
guns, " ... the best evidence indicates that guns are used about as often for
defensive purposes as for criminal purposes" (Ibid. 107).
If true, that is a
powerful reason to resist attempts to limit availability of guns (Kleck, G. 1997).
Such statistics, particularly when bolstered by moving anecdotes of those who
have saved their lives by having a gun, cannot be cavalierly dismissed by gun
control advocates.
However, these figures are inflated, likely dramatically so. First,
Kleck's methodology is flawed.
Surveys have an inherent tendency to
overestimate rare events. Kleck made his estimates based on phone interviews
with people in 5,000 dwelling units. One-percent of those units claimed to
have used a gun defensively in the past year. Kleck inferred from these
responses that there are 2.5 million defensive handgun uses per year. However,
since this inference is based on an affirmative answer by one person out of a
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hundred, that means for every chance for a false negative (someone who falsely
denies using a gun defensively) there are ninety-nine chances for a false positive
(someone
who
falsely
claims
to have used
a gun defensively)
(Hemenway, D. 1997). The probability that this or some other bias skews the
findings is substantial.
Second, Kleck's findings are inconsistent with findings by the National
Crime Victimization Survey (1996), which interviewed far more people, and
interviewed them more regularly. Kleck's estimates even clash with the NCVS
findings on the incidence and circumstances of robberies (which seems Ie s
subject to reporting bias). If Kleck's figures were correct, then "Kleck asks us to
believe that burglary victims in gun owning households use their guns in selfdefense more than 100% of the time, even though most were initially asleep"
(Hemenway, D. 1997: 1442).
Finally, if there were 2.5 million defensive gun uses each year, how
many of those were necessary?
Given the negative results of private gun
ownership, gun advocates should show not only that guns deter crime, but that
they are the best way of doing so. Some people plausibly claim that owning a
dog is an effective deterrent. If true, then a not insignificant percentage of those
who used a gun defensively could have achieved the same results without the
accompanying danger. In summary, there is no doubt that guns deter some
crime and stop the completion of other crimes. Just not in the numbers' that
Kleck claims.
John Lott supplements Kleck's argument by claiming that the
widespread use of concealed weapons would decrease the annual number of
homicides by 1,400, rapes by 4,200, aggravated assaults by 60,000, and
robberies by 12,000 (Lott, J. R. 1998: 54). If true, and if there were no
countervailing costs, this would be a powerful reason not only to permit guns,
but to encourage people to have and carry them. However, Lott's conclusion
have also come under severe criticism.
The central problem is that crime moves in waves, yet Lott's analysis does
not include variables that can explain these cycles. ~or example, he used
no variables on gangs, on drug consumption, or community policing. As a
result, many' of Lott's findings make no sense. He finds for instance, that
both increasing the rate of unemployment and reducing income reduces the
rate of violent crimes ... (Hemenway, D. 1998: 2029)
Perhaps the most compelling critique comes from lens Ludwig who
compares the rate of violent crime toward youths and adults in states that
passed shall-issue carrying permits. Most of these states issue guns
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permits only to people over 21. Armchair considerations predict that
younger people, who cannot legally carry, will not receive the full benefits
from the purported deterrent effect of shall-issue laws. Thus, those under
21 years of age are a nalmal conlrol group to track general swings in crime.
Once we include Ihis factor, we find Ihat shall-issue laws lead 10 higher .not lower - homicide and robbery rates (Ludwig, J. 1998).
I also have an overarching worry about Lott's conclusions.
The one
correlation in the gun control debate that is seemingly beyond dispute is the
high correlation between the presence of guns - especially handguns - and
homicide rates. Gun advocates offer explanations for the correlation, but no one
I have seen seriously challenges it. I find it difficult to square this correlation
with Kleck's and Lott's claims that having more guns - and toting them with us
- will lower crime.
An overall assessment of the empirical evidence
The strong correlation bctween the presence of guns and higher murder
rate is compelling.
Since the correlation is statistically significant to a .0 I
level, it is difficult to believe that limiting private gun ownership will not have
a noticeable effect on the number of murders. Gun advocates disagree: they
claim that cultural factors explain the correlation. Although I think they are
partly correct, they draw the wrong inference. For one crucial difference between
European and American cultures is the widespread presence of guns.
Each
culture is the way it is, at least in part, because of the role guns (or their
absence) played in its creation and maintenance. Therefore, curtailing the private
possession of guns might well change the American culture so that it would be
less violent. Consequently, it is not only that fewer guns would directly cause
some decline in violent crimes - which it should. It is also likely to reshape
the cultural values which, along with ready availability of deadly weapons, lead
to such an extraordinarily high murder rate in America.
On the other hand, the statistical evidence that guns prevent or thwart
crimes is suggestive and cannot be ignored, despite its identified weaknesses.
In summary, the overall statistical evidence tilts in favor of gun control
advocates, although the evidence is disputable. But we should not expect nor
do we need indisputable evidence. We can act on the best evidence we have,
while being open to new evidence. If widespread availability of guns were
responsible for 'even one-foulih of the increase in the number of murders, that
would be a significant hann the state should prevent if it could do so in a
relatively un intrusive and morally acceptable way.
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There is little doubt that we can do that, at least to some degree. If
nothing else we could control some types of guns and ammunition.
To take
one obvious example, Teflon-coated bullets are designed ·to pierce protective
vests. People do not use these bullets to pierce the vests on a deer or a squirrel,
on a target or a skeet. They use them to pierce the vests on people, usually law
enforcement officers. This ammunition has no purpose except to cause harm.
Hence, we are justified in abolishing Teflon bullets and in establishing severe
criminal penalties for those possessing them.
This would not save large
numbers of lives. But, assuming this ban's enforcement is not impractical,
then, if it saved even a few lives, that would be a compelling reason to outlaw
such bullets.
On the other hand, some guns have a much wider use, even if they are
occasionally used for ill. People have seemingly legitimate uses for shotguns
and single-shot rifles. Consequently, barring strong evidence to the contrary,
we should not abolish them. We should, however, study their contributory role
in causing harm, and explore ways we might lessen this harm in a relative
un intrusive way.
The central debate concerns handguns. The evidence we have shows
that handguns are disproportionately
used in homicides and in robberies.
Although "there are approximately three times as many long guns as handguns
in the US, more than 80% of gun homicides and 90% of gun robberies involve
handguns (Hemenway, D. 1995: 60).
The experience in Canada suggests that
criminals will not switch to long guns if handguns are unavailable. Given the
special role handguns play in causing harm, we have compelling reasons to
extensively control, or perhaps abolish, handguns. But, policy considerations,
mentioned earlier, should give us pause.

A

THIRD WAY

In the past we not only assumed that we must either support or oppose
gun control, we assumed that the only way to control guns is to legally
proscribe access to them. We should consider other options. Although I find
the idea of a world without handguns immensely appealing, there are reasons to
seek alternatives, especially in countries like the United States with a deeply
entrenched gun culture. In the present political climate, the abolition or serious
control of guns in the United States is unlikely to work and less unlikely to
happen. There are far too many people who desperately want guns. There are
far too many people who own guns. Any attempt to disann the society would
be beset with the problems like those that plagued Prohibition.
We have other
possibilities.
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We could employ elements of a policy we use to control another
inherently dangerous object: dynamite.
Dynamite has many beneficial uses.
That is why we permit people to own it under specifiable conditions, e.g., to
build a road. But it is also inherently dangerous. That is why we heavily
restrict its purchase, storage, and use. 1 cannot own dynamite for recreation (l
like the flash), for hunting (I am a lousy shot) or for protection (I would not
hear an intruder). Owning dynamite is rarely a significant interest, and never a
fundamental one. More important to the present point, even when we do permit
people to own dynamite, we subject them to strict legal liability. The owner is
financially liable for any harm caused by his dynamite, even if he was not
negligent.
I propose we make handgun owners (and perhaps ultimately all gun
owners) strictly liability for harm caused by the use of their guns. If Jones'
child takes his gun and kills someone while committing a crime, then Jones
will be financially responsible to those hanned.
If Jones's child accidentally
kills a neighbor's child, Jones will be financially responsible to the child's
family. If someone steals Jones's gun and kills someone while robbing them,
then Jones will owe the victim compensatory damages. And if Jones were
negligent in the storing of the gun, he could be subject to punitive damages as
well. Perhaps if he were grossly negligent in the storing the gun (he left if
lying in his front yard, next to a school playground), we might even bring
criminal charges against him.
This procedure is justified since guns are inherently dangerous, and it
is only reasonable to expect people to take responsibility for their risky actions.
The benefits are notable: many people would be disinclined to own guns, while
those owning guns would likely take greater care in storing, handling, and using
them. This could arguably achieve the central aims of gun control without
direct government intervention. Doubtless that means that some people will be
forced to pay for the misdeeds or mistakes of others in ways we might dislike.
However, that is a more attractive policy than continuing the current scheme in
which guns are easily obtained in the United States, or than completely denying
individuals' interest in owning guns.
To make this option more palatable, we could let gun owners purchase
liability insurance to cover potential losses. We might even require them to
purchase insurance. After all, most states require drivers to have automobile
insurance. This insurance-backed system of strict liability would make people
take more care with any guns they own, while providing financial remuneration
to those harmed by the use of those guns.
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Perhaps this will not work. Other proposals might work better. What
seems clear to me is that we need to do something: we cannot continue with the
status quo.
Notes
• 1 wish to thank Nicholas Dixon, Lester H. Hunt, Eva LaFollette, members of
philosophy departments at East Tennessee State University and the University
of West em Michigan, as well as the editors and two anonymous readers of this
journal, for helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this paper.
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